Grain being harvested in Odessa, Ukraine. Image credit: CGTN.

Editor’s note: This is part two of a three-part series into how Canada and the broader West used a compliant post-Maidan coup government to privatize agriculture to the severe detriment of ordinary Ukrainians. This part focuses on how the Western pushed privatization crippled Ukrainian agricultural capacity.

Written by: Peter Korotaev

In 2016, US ambassador to Ukraine Geoffrey Pyatt stated that "Ukraine is already one of the largest producers of agricultural commodities, but it must become an agricultural superpower”.

The description of Ukraine as a ‘guarantor of global food security’ has become a classic of publications concerning Ukraine in the Euro-Atlantic press. This article will examine the reality behind the boasts of the US government regarding Ukraine’s liberalized agriculture. How effective and sustainable is Ukraine’s liberalized agriculture at feeding its citizens?

Primitivization of Ukrainian agriculture

In 2020, Ukraine’s Deputy PM for European and Euro-Atlantic Integration delivered the stock usual euro-optimist litany, which hasn’t changed an iota since 2013-era Yatsenyuk promising the German lifestyle from signing the EU free trade agreement:

"The association agreement and the free trade area with the EU have become the engine for the development of the Ukrainian economy - because it opened the way to the largest market on the continent"

This market, however, has only been interested in a small list of extremely primitive Ukrainian goods. UkraineInvest, the government agency which advertises the country for foreign investment, promotes Ukraine as ‘the land of agri opportunities…. with cheap labour … and cheap land rent’. In 2019, agricultural and food exports rose the most of all economic sectors compared to 2018 – by 19 per cent. But eeprocessed agricultural exports only rose by 5 per cent, thanks to sunflower oil. In the first half of 2020, when the EU closed off its market to Ukraine but did not allow Ukraine to do the same during Covid, trade turnover between the two fell by 5.1 per cent. In this same period, over half of Ukraine’s exports to the EU were composed of cereals, sunflower oil, processed food waste, and oil seeds.

9.4 per cent of all imports in 2019 were agricultural goods and food products, $5.7 billion worth of production. 46 per cent of all agricultural imports were finished food products, with the proportion of such goods imported from abroad growing by the year.

Ukrainian economic journalist Roman Gubrienko summarizes the situation whereby Ukraine’s economy is highly dependent on a very primitive agricultural sector:

Almost 50 per cent of Ukraine’s state revenues are dependent on the export of products and services to foreign markets. At the same time, about 40 per cent of foreign exchange export earnings come from products of the agro-industrial complex. According to the State Fiscal Service, in 2019 the export of Ukrainian agricultural products grew by 19 per cent, amounting to a record $22.2 billion. Of the entire array of agricultural products, only 202.9 million dollars worth of ready-made food products were exported.

Ukraine imported 30 per cent more processed vegetable goods than it exported in 2021. It imported six times more finished meat and fish products than it exported in 2021. It only imported 3.5 times more finished meat and fish products than it exported in 2012, so the situation has certainly worsened. The only good classified as ‘finished food product’ which it succeeded in achieving a trade surplus was sugar, hardly a technologically complex product, and one where imports are still 70 per cent the size of exports and growing.

Of the 90-95 million tons of agricultural crops harvested on average in recent years, 60 million is instantly exported and only the remaining 30-35 million is subjected to minimal domestic reprocessing. Of 70 million tons of grain goods harvested, only about 20 million is domestically processed. The only sector where significant amounts – still only slightly over half – of production is domestically processed is the sunflower oil sector.

It is only fairly primitive forms of agriculture that have consistently increased production in Ukraine since Euromaidan. Animal and vegetable oils (read: sunflower oil) exports rocketed up from $4.1 billion USD in 2012 to $7.3 billion in 2021. Grain exports rose from $7 billion to $12 billion. The following graph shows which agricultural products it exported more than it imported and which agricultural products it imported more than it exported in 2021:

As can be seen, Ukraine exports unprocessed agricultural goods, and imports food products and processed agricultural goods.

Decline in Ukrainian livestock production and quality

In our last article, we saw how big agrobusiness has risen at the cost of smaller farmers. But these small-scale farmers are crucial for Ukraine’s food supply. While only using 12 per cent of Ukraine’s total farmland, they produce over 50 per cent of the country’s agricultural output – 98 per cent of potatoes, 89 per cent of vegetables, 78 per cent of milk, and 74 per cent of beef.

In January 2020, the volume of Ukraine’s gross agricultural production declined by 0.7 per cent compared to January 2019. In January 2019, it only increased by 3 per cent. But the situation is worse when you look at individual sectors of agricultural food production.

Livestock

In 2018, when confronted with evidence of huge subsidies for his and others’ agroholdings, Poroshenko ally Yurshinin responded that ‘the government cares deeply for the state of livestock farming in Ukraine, that is why we received these funds’. Whatever ‘care’ the government has for livestock farming, it has not amounted to much.

In 2018 and 2019, the number of cows, pigs, sheep, and goats per capita declined. Only the amount of birds farmed increased, due to their popularity on export markets. The following graph from Roman Gubrienko shows the change in Ukraine’s food production for 2019. The important part of this graph is the orange – this represent the number of these livestock per capita, as a per cent of the 2018 figure. As can be seen, there was a large decline in livestock for all non-bird sectors from 2018-2019.

This is all because of the economic liberalization of Ukraine’s agricultural market. It takes less time to grow birds for export than it does for other livestock, so agroholdings invest in birds. The production of pigs, cows, and sheep has negative profit rates in Ukraine – from -7 per cent to -25 per cent. As we mentioned in our previous article, another factor are huge subsidies for big poultry agroholdings like that belonging to Yuri Kosyuk, a good friend of Poroshenko and the US State Department.

From April 2019-April 2020, the number of pigs in Ukraine declined by 6 per cent, a loss of 400 thousand pigs. In the first 4 months of 2020, 3500 tons of pigs were imported – 2.3 times less than the same period a year ago, a telling indicator of the decline in Ukrainian consumption as a result of the covid quarantine. Only 900 000 tons of pigs were exported in the same period, 75 per cent of which went to the UAE as part of special agricultural agreements signed with Ukraine.

The situation was no better in 2020-21. In this period, there were declines of 5-6 per cent in all forms of livestock (including poultry) apart from pigs – here, the growth of large agroholdings specializing in pigs cancelled out the decline in small scale pig farming. Nevertheless, pig numbers only increased by 3.7 per cent. However, the amount of pigs in 2021 was still lower than the amount in 2019, meaning that the brief increase did not compensate the losses of the catastrophic Covid year in 2020.

Despite previous successful years, poultry exports declined in 2020 because of the difficulty of exporting chicken meat and eggs to the EU due to the quarantine. The EU increased its support to domestic farmers, while also forbidding Ukraine from doing the same for its own businesses. As Gubrienko writes, big Ukrainian agroholdings have no interest in supplying the small domestic market of low wage-Ukrainians, meaning that any fluctuations on export markets have negative effects on Ukrainian agriculture.

Dairy

2020 was the first year that Ukraine became a net importer of dairy products, with exports in the first quarter decreasing by 9.3 per cent and imports increasing by 167 per cent. As a result of the decline in the cow industry, where the number of this form of livestock declines by 5-7 per cent every year, the milk industry, despite its profitability, has also suffered. This also results in a decline of Ukraine’s precious food processing industry, like that creating cheese or kefir (a fermented milk drink popular among the eastern Slavs). In 2019, there was a 25 per cent decline in milk per capita that went to reprocessing facilities compared to 2018, or a 9 per cent gross decrease. The amount of high quality milk purchased by processing facilities declined by 53 per cent per capita.

Ukraine’s milk industry began seriously declining in 2018, when exports fell by 40 per cent compared to the previous year. According to state statistics, after the first 3 months of 2020, Ukraine was already a net-importer of milk products. By the first half of 2020, Ukraine’s milk exports had declined by 9 per cent, while imports increased by 168 per cent as compared to the same period of the previous year. According to the association of milk productions, after the first 10 months of 2020 milk exports had declined by 20 per cent compared to the same period in the previous year. According to state statistics, 2020 was a record year for Ukrainian cheese imports, more than doubling the previous years’ figure. Milk and cream imports, meanwhile, increased by 310 per cent.

The number of cows decreased by 6.35 per cent in 2019, as compared to 2018. According to the national scientific center ‘Institute of Agrarian Economics’, Ukraine’s milk production will fall by 12.3 per cent by 2030, with family farming production falling by 31.1 per cent. Gubrienko grimly jokes that cows will soon have to be placed on the red list of endangered animals in Ukraine.

In the first quarter of 2021, the amount of Ukrainian milk heading towards processing facilities in Ukraine declined by 12.3 per cent. The same figure declined by 9.1 per cent and 7.6 per cent in 2019 and 2020. In 2020, only a third of the milk that went to processing facilities in Ukraine came from Ukraine.

Decline in food quality

Not only has the milk industry declined, but so has the quality of milk sold. The state department of consumer service stated that milk products are the food group most commonly sold with fake ingredients in Ukraine. They are constantly forced to fine milk product distributors tens of millions of hryvnia for selling milk products which do not contain real milk. Often, butter and cheese is secretly made with trans unsaturated fat, emulsifiers and palm oil.

One reason for this, according to Gubrienko, is the weakness or lack of state bodies to rigorously monitor food quality production. In the deregulated environment, businesses do whatever it takes to get the highest profits – the state anti-monopoly committee said that one dairy company earned 100 per cent profits by using illegal non-milk ingredients.

Gubrienko argues that this is also due to the decreasing amount of domestic cow numbers and milk production – as a result, for milk-intensive products like butter, producers are forced to supplement real milk with less healthy products. The amount of dairy production and exports far exceeds the amount of dairy products that could be produced in Ukraine given its annual milk production. He calculates that from 25-50 per cent of Ukraine’s dairy products involved falsified ingredients.

Food inflation and hunger

Despite its enviable status as a guarantor of global food security, according to Ukrainian state statistics food prices rose by 10.9 per cent from January-October 2021, as compared to the same period in 2020. Egg prices increased by 54 per cent, sugar by 69 per cent, bread by 15 per cent, and sunflower oil by 61 per cent. This is despite Ukraine’s famed status as the world’s top sunflower oil exporter.

While agricultural goods as per cent of total exports rose from 39 per cent in 2018 to 44 per cent in 2019, we already know that this is not thanks to increases in livestock production. The top Ukrainian agricultural goods exported are wheat, corn, and sunflower oil, goods for which Ukraine is among the global export leaders.

Liberal experiments in price deregulation

The former Canadian ambassador to Ukraine Roman Waschuk famously called post-maidan Ukraine a ‘laboratory for ideal-world experimentation’. One such experiment was in the field of price regulation – in 2016, state regulation of food prices was temporarily cancelled, and in 2017 this regime was made permanent. The liberal, pro-west prime minister of the time, Volodymyr Groisman, explained it by saying that state regulation is in itself ineffective and had not stopped price increases anyway.

Borscht catastrophe

In 2018, the ‘borscht-basket’ – a measure of the price of vegetable goods most commonly consumed by average Ukrainians in the national soup dish – rose in price by five times. In January-October 2019, the amount of imported cabbage, carrots and capsicum rose by 20-30 per cent compared to the same period in 2018. Imports of tomatoes increased by 15 per cent and imports of cucumbers by 38 per cent. Imports of onions increased by 26 times. The worst situation was in potato production – here, Ukraine imported 700 times more in June-October 2019 than it did for the same period in 2018. They were mostly imported from Belarus and Russia. Gubrienko ties the fall in potato production with Ukraine’s Covid quarantine restrictions on farmers markets, which led to protests by small farmers in the Kherson region.

Summarizing state statistics, the analytics company EastFruit writes this about inflationary trends in the ‘borscht basket’:

“Wholesale prices for carrots are twice as high as last year, prices for onions are two and a half times higher, prices for white cabbage are three times higher, and prices for table beet are also three times higher. That is, the average prices for the borscht vegetables have increased by 2.6 times compared to the beginning of December 2020".

In Gubrienko’s words, ‘judging by the dynamics of prices for borscht products, the sacred Ukrainian dish will move away from being a traditional national cuisine towards becoming an elite gastronomic one.’ This is the uncomfortable reality behind the patriotic hysteria of the government, which sponsored a TV series ‘the history and traditions of preparing borscht’, including online battles on the best borscht recipes. The official Ukrainian Twitter account often goes on online offensives to make sure borscht is considered a uniquely Ukrainian, not Russian food, taking the matter all the way to UNESCO. This is despite the fact that most of its ingredients are imported, even coming from ‘enemy nations’ such as Belarus and Russia.

Gubrienko believes that the major factor behind the rising cost of borscht is Ukraine’s dependence on importing all the ingredients. Apart from the usual EU suspects, Ukraine imports pork from the USA and Norway, and onions from Uzbekistan and Mexico. Importing these products from so far away itself adds to the price. In addition, its top supplier of potatoes is Belarus, with which Ukraine constantly strives to conflict with as a way of signaling its worth to the US as ‘the frontier of Western civilization’.

In 2020, even tiny Albania was the absolute leader in supplying Ukraine with cabbage. Albania exported $425 million dollars worth of cabbage to Ukraine, covering 90 per cent of Ukraine’s import needs. Ukraine, meanwhile, only exported $116 million worth of this stable vegetable.

Ukraine imported 1377 times more potatoes than it exported in 2020. ‘Authoritarian Belarus’ was the leader – not coincidentally, it has a highly developed system of state assistance to small and medium farmers.

Ukraine’s potato problems also shed light on its exploitative relation with the EU. In May 2020, it emerged that Dutch potatoes which were only used to make French fries (that couldn’t be sold at the time due to covid lockdowns) were shipped off to Ukraine to be consumed as normal potatoes, which is illegal in the EU. They sold for the same price as Ukrainian potatoes in Ukraine. If not for this, these potatoes would have been destroyed.

While Ukraine at least exports decent amounts of carrots, it still imports 3 times more. And worse, it mainly imports them from high-wage EU countries, meaning that while EU consumers get cheap Ukrainian carrots, poor Ukrainian consumers need to pay high EU prices for basic food goods. The situation with beetroot, the main ingredient of borscht, is very bad – Ukraine exports none, and imports $40 million dollars-worth, all from Italy – a country whose farms are filled with Ukrainian migrant workers fleeing from unemployment. Ukraine has fertile soils and talented workers, but it buys agricultural goods from abroad.

The situation is also bad in buckwheat production, a staple food in Ukraine, especially for the poor. In the first half of 2019, Ukraine imported twice as much as it exported, with the amount of sown land dedicated to this crop declining by 10 per cent compared to 2018. While it exports huge amounts of corn and wheat, Ukraine’s imports of all cereals and grains increased by 2.4 times in 2018.

Collapse of the pig front

Salo – cured pig lard – is another contender for Ukrainian national dish. Unfortunately, 2018 was a record year for pork and salo imports, increasing by 520 per cent compared to the previous year. The beneficiaries of this increased pork import demand were, as usual, Ukraine’s ‘european allies’ – Poland, Germany, and the Netherlands. Ukraine’s 2018 exports of pork also declined by 36 per cent. The situation did not improve in 2019, with pork imports in the first half of the year increasing by another 5 per cent. Ukraine only exported 32 000 tons of salo, importing 30 000 tons.

*Caption: A helpful* *infographic* *from Gubrienko. It shows the per cent increase in imports of various food goods in the first half of 2019, as compared to the same period in the previous year.* *The top three foods don’t show per cent, but by how many times imports have increased.*

The salo situation got even worse in 2021. In the first ten10 months of that year, Ukraine imported four times more salo than it produced. Gubrienko describes two main processes leading to the decline of this national cuisine product. Over the past 30 years since the end of the USSR there has been a constant decline in the number of swine. The scale of the decline is immense – in 1990, there were 20 million pigs in Ukraine, and by 2021 – 5.9 million. In the privatizing chaos of the 1990s alone, pig numbers declined by 60 per cent, to 8.4 million. The second stage was from 2000-2011, when the number of pigs declined due to urbanization, migration, and general depopulation of the countryside areas, resulting in a decrease in domestic farming of pigs. The third stage was from 2011-2016, when agroholdings began developing more rapidly. This was a period of slower decline, with pig stocks decreasing by 500 thousand. The final stage was from 2016-2021, following the victory of the Euromaidan coup and Ukraine’s free trade agreement with the EU. With all economic regulation gone and full power in the hands of big agrobusiness, the number of pigs declined by over a million in only 5 years.

Gubrienko goes on to show that due to the critically low amount of domestic pigs, the years when Ukraine has processed the most salo are the same years that Ukraine’s live pig imports soared. In other words, Ukrainian salo production has become dependent on imports. He also discusses how Ukrainian domestic salo price levels have become dependent on import levels. Considering Ukraine’s debt and currency reserves problems, this is a quite dangerous situation. It is noteworthy that prior to 2014, Ukraine imported almost five times more pigs and salo per year than after. It is possible, though Gubrienko does not mention this, that this is due to the import restrictions placed on Ukraine following the 2014 adoption of harsh IMF austerity measures, the collapse of exports, the decline of domestic purchasing power, and the devaluation of the currency.

One of the main causes for this pig apocalypse is what Gubriienko calls the ‘blitskrieg offensive’ of western producers into Ukraine’s swine market. Before 2009, 95 per cent of Ukraine’s swine and salo imports were from south America. But by 2015, 70 per cent of all Ukraine’s pig product imports, and 100 per cent of all salo imports were from the EU. Poland, Germany, the Netherlands and Canada were the main sources – another way that the west has benefited from Ukraine’s ‘civilizational choice in favor of the Europe’, a choice that has been much more beneficial for one side than the other. Out of the $20 million worth of pork products imported by Ukraine in 2020, $6.5 million was from Canada – Canada imported none of these products from Ukraine, showing how much exactly of a mutually beneficially relationship they enjoy. But Ukraine’s weak domestic agriculture means that other forms of national betrayal are also possible – Ukraine’s main source for salo in the second half of 2021 was Russia.

Causes of food inflation

In August 2021, food prices in Ukraine continued rising. Gubrienko points out that this is contrary to global trends, where food prices declined 1.2 per cent in comparison to July. He wonders why global price trends have not pushed down Ukrainian food prices, since the government always referred to global price trends in justifying food price inflation in the past. Gubrienko calls this the ‘paradox of the Ukrainian agricultural superpower’. Prices for pork, eggs, milk and chicken meat rose by two to five per cent in just the second week of August. This is all despite the fact that prices for agricultural goods should fall at this time of year as the harvest comes through. The food price index as a whole rose by 8.6 per cent from January-August 2021.

Why have prices kept rising on Ukraine’s domestic food market? One crucial role is the fall in domestic production, replaced by goods that are often more expensive since they must be imported from countries as distant as Canada.

An expert interviewed by Gubrienko argues that the uncertain political situation surrounding the trade war between Ukraine and Belarus, began by Ukraine in its indignation at Belarus’s ‘authoritarian human rights abuses’, was likely to blame for producers increasing food prices in 2021 despite global trends.

Importer cartels are also a factor. It is a much-derided fact that sunflower oil is two times more expensive in Ukrainian supermarkets than in Poland. This means that Ukrainians, whose wages are two to three times lower than Polish wages and many times lower than EU wages, end up paying more than EU citizens do for them. Ukrainian news portal UNN writes that the fact that the anti-monopoly committee has been investigating this problem for five years, with no verdict, is clearly politically motivated. They link this to the wealth of Berevzsky, the owner of Ukraine’s biggest agroholding ‘Kernel’, and one of Ukraine’s 20 richest men.

The problem of importer cartels is not limited to sunflower oil. The Union of Ukrainian Businessmen sent a letter to the Ukrainian anti-monopoly committee to curb the rise in sugar prices, which rose 170-190 per cent over global sugar prices over the past year. They blame this on price cartels among sugar producers and importers and also note the damage on production caused by price rises on this important product.

Despite exporting slightly more than it imports, as for most agricultural products import substitution has also played a role in sugar price increases. Exports fell by 31 per cent in 2019 and 2 per cent in 2021, while imports rose by 5 per cent in 2019 and by a stunning 132 per cent in 2021. By 2021, Ukraine was exporting $24 million worth of sugar and importing $17 million.

Another factor is energy inflation. This, in turn, is largely due to Ukraine’s bad relations with Russia, an energy war exploited by the USA in its aim to get Europe buying American gas and trade less with Russia. As a result, Ukraine in 2021 was among the top 5 countries when it came to energy prices.

Global food security but domestic hunger

While Ukraine tops the charts in export of primitive agricultural raw materials like sunflower oil and corn, it received the 63rd spot out of 113 countries rated by the global index of food security. Gubrienko compares Ukraine with other food insecure nations such as Somalia. Such countries have no state interference in the economy, meaning that agriculture is grown for export to the detriment of domestic consumers. Big agroholdings don’t have any interest in satisfying Ukraine’s tiny internal market – in 2021, 85 per cent of Ukrainians earned less than $300 a month.

UNICEF annual hunger reports found that 20 per cent (almost 9 million people) of Ukrainians in 2018-20 suffered from ‘moderate to severe food insecurity’, and 22.7 per cent (10 million people) in 2019-21– for comparison, the average score in Europe was 8 per cent. This places Ukraine at around the same level as Brazil (in the 2014-16 period, Ukraine’s situation was even worse than Brazil’s), where 23.5 per cent of the population suffered from moderate and severe food insecurity in 2018-20. According to the global hunger index, the amount of Ukrainians suffering from hunger rose stayed at 7.2 per cent in 2007 and 2014, rising to 7.5 per cent in 2022. This is a higher level than that in Iran, Uzbekistan and Mongolia.

The fall in incomes and employment resulting from Euromaidan was reflected by a fall in real consumption. According to official Ukrainian statistics, in 2013 54 per cent of Ukrainian earned less than $280 a month. In 2020, 85 per cent of Ukrainians earned less than $291 a month. Average household meat consumption only returned to its 2013 level of 5.1 kg in 2019 - it had fallen as low as 4.6 kg in 2015.

Black soil, dead soil: ecological degradation

Here is the final sad irony. Not only can the guarantor of global food security not feed its own citizens. The narrow, export-based ‘corn and sunflower republic’ is destroying its famous ‘ultrafertile black soil’.

One ominous sign has been the decline in the area of sown agricultural land sown. The ten year peak was reached in 2013, with 28 million hectares sown. During the 2008-09 and 2014-15 crises, this figure declined to 26.8 million hectares. In 2020, around 24 million hectares were predicted to be sown.

Nevertheless, exports of primitive agricultural raw materials have been booming – 2019 was a record year for exports of grains and legumes. While agriculture for domestic consumers is suffering, agriculture for export has never done so well. 2020 saw farmers increasing the share of sown land dedicated to sunflower oil, corn, and soy, while decreasing the amount dedicated to wheat, vegetables, potatoes and sugar beet. This is all due to price trends on the global agricultural market, and also contributes to domestic price inflation for these food goods.

The quality of Ukrainian agricultural land is not a matter of concern for the government. They limit themselves to declarations on the fantastic productivity of Ukraine’s black soil, which can only be unlocked through privatization. The last state program on the preservation of soil quality was created in 2008-9. Its ambitious goals were never realized. The State Cadastral Service (Gosgeokadastr) has never been able to collect a full base of information on all Ukrainian agricultural land. The problem of soil quality is no longer brought up by the Ukrainian government.

Timofey Milovanov, the economically libertarian minister of economic development, declared in 2019 his desire to liquidate Gosgeokadastr. A law project to that end was submitted, where Gosgeokadastr would be ‘decentralized’ in the course of the liberalization of agriculture, with control given to ‘local communities’. Though this project was not implemented, Gosgeokadastr remains quite neglected and ideas to remove it are popular among the ruling elite.

Gosgeokadastrv conducted 199 inspections of agricultural land from December 2019 to January 2020. It found 111 violations of agricultural legislation. Thus, even this superficial investigation revealed that Ukrainian agricultural land is being harshly mistreated by capitalist agriculture.

According to a 2021 study by the NGO Eco-Action and the Ukrainian Institute of Geology, the concentration of Ukrainian land by agroholdings has had parlous effects on Ukrainian soil quality. The rise of agroholdings has meant that 40 per cent of Ukraine’s arable land is intensively farmed with monocultures - corn, sunflower, rapeseed and soy. The share sown with these monocultures rose by 2.7 per cent from 2017-2020, and by 6.9 per cent in the black-soil central and western regions of Ukraine.

The study argues that all this land is hence at risk of becoming infertile – nearly half of Ukraine’s arable resources. In 2020, about 83 per cent of Ukraine’s agricultural land was sown with grains – ‘absolutely barbaric, no culture of arable farming’, in the words of a Ukrainian agricultural expert.

The last detailed data on the condition of Ukrainian agricultural soil comes from the state institute for the preservation of Ukrainian soil (SIPUS), in its 2018 report on conditions in 2011-2015. This is what it had to say:

Long-term intensification and excessive plowing have led to a threatening state of the soil in Ukraine. The main reasons for the decline in agronomically important soil properties are insufficient application of organic and mineral fertilizers, water and wind erosion, and over-consolidation by powerful heavy machinery. On the territory of Ukraine, 57.5 per cent of agricultural soil is subject to erosion, and these tendencies are continuing

The report also blamed excessive use of nitrogen fertilizers for increasing harvest sizes at the cost of decreasing long-term soil fertility. The report finds Ukraine’s agricultural liberalization to blame for many problems. For instance, the lack of state funds dedicated to analyzing the agrochemical condition of Ukrainian soil. Or the lack of state regulation, which allows agricultural producers to do with their soil whatever they wish.

In Ukraine, it is popular to compare Ukraine with the EU, but generally with the aim of convincing the reader to agree to all the demands made by Ukraine’s ‘western partners’. Gubrienko also compares the EU to Ukraine. He describes how the SIPUS report favorably compared Germany’s agricultural system to Ukraine’s. In Germany, there is a complex system of soil regulation. Agricultural producers must plant certain crops in line with the recommendations of the soil quality advisors. This contrasts with Ukraine, where crop choices are made according to the whims of the global market, with no regard for soil quality. In addition, in Germany the size of agricultural land owned by each company is limited – hence, the average amount of agricultural land owned by farmers is 20 hectares. Monoculture farmers are limited to owning 5-6 hectares of land. 400-500 hectares is considered large by German standards. In Ukraine, meanwhile, big agroholdings own 300-500 thousand hectares of land.

Ukrainian agrochemical scientist Vadym Ivanin said in an interview that while in western European countries no more than 50 per cent of agricultural land is cultivated, and in the US 25 per cent, while the rest is used for grazing and other uses. This allows adequate recovery of soils. In Ukraine, however, 90 per cent is cultivated, and there is hardly any grazing land. Ivanin also recommends increasing the amount of forested land by 12 times to prevent erosion – apart from the Carpathian region, only 15 per cent of Ukraine’s steppe area is covered by forests. In the EU, no countries have less than 26 per cent.

It is worth mentioning here that Ukraine’s Carpathian forests have been dramatically exploited in recent years by European logging companies. An attempt to implement an export ban in 2015 was ruled illegitimate by the EU, due to Ukraine’s responsibilities in its FTA with the EU. Ukraine serves as the source for cheap timber used by ‘civilized’ European brands like Ikea. An apt illustration of general trends.

Part three of this series will be where Canada’s role is discussed.

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Peter Korotaev writes on political movements, class relations, and economic policy in Ukraine. You can follow his work on his substack, "Events in Ukraine".

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